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ABSTRACT
The small LDCs which own the great bulk of oil resour-
ces are rational agents and calculate with short horizons and
high discount rates. They have pre-commitments to spend much (or
even more than all) of their incomes, hence behave like highly
leveraged corporations. They are also undiversified, hence the
risk factors are set not by covariance with a diversified
portfolio or sources of income, but rather by the variance of the
oil income stream itself. Political risk is additional. High
discount rates act both to raise and lower the depletion rate, so
the net effect is indeterminate without knowledge of costs, not
considered here. High discount rates sharply lower the effective
elasticity of demand, and lead to a cartel policy of "take the
money and run."

OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES' DISCOUNT RATES
1. Introduction
The great bulk of world oil resources and reserves are
owned by a few small less-developed countries (LDCs). To make
the best use of assets, they must choose between near-term and
farther-off costs and benefits. This requires a set of appropri-
ate discount rates.
The rates may be implicit, never stated as such. If a
party is willing to give up a dollar today for two dollars
expected in 14 years, he may not realize that he is using
a 5 percent discount rate, any more than the party unwilling to
wait even four years is aware that he is using more than 20
percent. Both parties are like the man who talked prose for 40
years without knowing it was prose. Their actions may reveal
their preferences more accurately than could their words.
We are particularly interested in two areas of choice.
(1) The optimal rate of reserve depletion, which determines
the timing and scale of investment. The owners must decide
at what point the present value of an additional barrel left in
the ground exceeds the price (for a competitor) or the marginal
revenue (for a monopoly).
(The unqualified statement that "oil in the ground is
worth more than money in the bank" logically implies that the
4optimal depletion rate is zero. It has been a very influential
dogma.)
Today the government-owner usually makes the investment-
production decisions directly. However, other nations negotiate
with private companies (usually foreign) to find and develop
oil. They need to know both th
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5which is moved from well to well at considerable expense and can
only be resold in a narrow market at highly variable prices; and
in exploration wells in remote areas, which are literally sunk
costs. The three risk classes require three discount rates.
However, this paper is not concerned with the family of rates
within the firm, but rather with the difference between two
groups of firms, private versus public.
We first summarize the estimates of discount rates
applicable to private parties in developed countries with
diversified capital markets. We next indicate the factors which
would tend to make the producing nations' discount rates higher
or lower than the private rate. We arrive at LDC discount rates
which are much higher than those of private firms in developed
economies. We consider some of the possible objections to
our findings, and conclude with some very limited conclusions
about the effect on depletion rates and oil prices.
2. Private il and Gas Producers' Discount Rates
[TABLE I HERE]
Table I prerei's some recent estimates of the discount
rates, or cost of capital, of private firms producing crude oil
and natural gas in the United States and Canada. Because the
industry is so international, these rates apply to any large
private firm in the industrial world.
6There is some variation, as is to be expected. In my
view, the Baldwin-Mason-Ruback estimate is too high because it
is based on only one year. It is statistically robust because
it is based on a large enough sample to represent 1979 condi-
tions, but the year 1979 is not a good sample of the recent past.
A very brief review of elementary finance theory is
necessary to see how we will go from the private discount rate to
the rate at which a government should discount its oil and gas
revenues.
The usual formulation is: D = RF + Beta(RM - RF), where D
is the expected discount rate, RF the expected risk-free rate,
and RM the expected return on a diversified portfolio of assets.
Historical series are entered for RF and RM as the best approxim-
ations. Beta is the measure of covariance between the market
rate RM and the return on the particular asset in question,
estimated by least-squares regression. As just seen, any
two estimates of D will vary, depending upon the observations
composing RM and RF.
The premium over the risk-free rate is a return for risk,
conceived as the undiversifiable variability of the gains
from operating the venture to which the investors' funds are
committed. The variability is unknown because the future is
unknown, but is expected to be much like the past. The chances
7of gaining or losing by holding and operating the asset an ad-
ditional year are measured by the fluctuations in the past.
Past fluctuations are measured by the standard devia-
tion of past gains and losses. But the risk measure Beta
reflects not the variability of the asset itself, but the
variability which that asset contributes to the "market port-
folio", the whole portfolio of assets owned by or available to
investors. The distinction between variance and covariance will
be of particular importance.
If there is perfect covariance between the given asset's
income and the market portfolio's income, the asset neither adds
to nor subtracts from the risk of holding the portfolio, Beta is
unity, and the risk premium for the asset is that for the market
generally.
If the asset's earnings fluctuate with the gains of the
whole portfolio, but more widely, then it adds something to
risk; if less widely, it diminishes risk. Or if the asset's
earnings fluctuate out of harmony with the rest of the market
portfolio, then it tends to stabilize the portfolio's earnings,
and diminish risk. In such instances, Beta is less than unity.
The asset might seem very risky in isolation, if we knew
only its variance. But its interaction with the market portfolio
might be such as to make its incremental risk very low, and the
discount rate should reflect this. Conceivably, the asset's
8earnings might even fluctuate inversely to the portfolio's. The
asset might be worth taking on as a diversifier even when there
were expected losses not gains. Because of the covariance, the
discount rate on the asset in question might be zero, or even
negative.
The Beta on a corporation is measured in two stages. First,
the gains to holding a share of corporate stock are measured
against the market portfolio, and an equity Beta computed. This
is adjusted or unlevered (usually simply multiplied) by the ratio
of equity to total equity-plus-debt of the firm in question, to
derive an asset Beta.
The reason for this adjustment is that the equity Beta
incorporates not only the business risk in holding the asset, but
also the financial risk of leveraging. When there are obliga-
tions such as debts or leases, part of the stream of net revenues
is pre-committed. The residual, revenues minus pre-fixed
contractual payments, is the more volatile stream determining
risk and return to the shareholder. (This assumes that the debt
is riskless to the creditor, which may not be quite true. See
Table I above, note explaining the Paddock estimates.)
The stock market does not include all other assets an
owner might hold, or his other sources of income, although those
others may be highly correlated with the stock market. The use
of a stock market Beta may overstate variability to some degree,
9though there is no reason in theory why it must. ([Stambaugh
1982] concludes it does not.)
The usual assumption is that any individual investor
can diversify against the market portfolio. Hence the differen-
ces in risk between any two assets or projects depend only on the
characteristics of the two assets. We will soon be compelled to
depart from this assumption.
3. Preliminary observations about nation-owners
There has long been controversy over the use of private
discount rates to determine the "social discount rate" which is
to govern the investment decisions of public bodies. But we do
not address this question. We seek only to know at what rate to
discount the flow of revenues from petroleum-producing assets, in
order to calculate a present value of the flow. Then it is
comparable with any other flow, from an existing or proposed
asset. [Compare Lind (1982)]
The risk premium does not depend on the time preference
of the discounter. 1 Risk, unlike beauty, is not in the eye of
the beholder; like the mountain, it is simply there. The greater
the risk, the lower the present value of a given flow.
1 Strictly speaking, the riskless rate summarizes the pure
rate of time preference of the various individuals in the same
way as a market price sums up their tastes.
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Owners' needs, and attitudes to risk, govern their choices
of assets. "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen." If the assets held are too risky for a given owner's
taste or needs, they should be exchanged for lower-yield
lower-risk holdings. A nation-state may be more or less risk-av-
erse than a private firm or household. But a given bundle of
assets comprising an oil company presents the same risk to one
or the other--unless their portfolios are radically different (of
which more below).
3.1 Cartel nations are rational
A common misconception is that the OPEC nations are
arm-waving wild men, nuts, incapable of making rational policy.
At worst this is mere prejudice; at best it is simply gratuitous
and unfounded.
Internal OPEC documents rarely get into the public press,
but those which do are revealing: for example, the 1980 report
of the OPEC long-term strategy committee (summarized in [PIW
1980]), or a paper submitted by Iran to an OPEC committee
meeting. [PIW 1983] One may disagree with what is said, but
the arguments are ,rsrectable and certainly the tone is calm.
Kaddafi, Khomeini, and others less flamboyant, are
bloody-minded, full of hate, see the United States as the Great
Satan, etc. But whatever their goals, the more revenues the
better to advance them. Some, for a time, may overlook this.
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The "moderate" Bani-Sadr (who had an economics degree) allowed
much of the Iranian oil industry to be ruined, possibly because
he really believed it was not "needed". His more ferocious
successors have acted much more rationally. Their minds were
concentrated by the Iraqi attack, and the need for money to buy
arms. Hence they settled claims with the United States, and
moved swiftly to carry out their agreement. "This curious blend
of Holy War against the Great Satan and business-as-usual with
his bankers is typical of the paradox that is Khomeini's Iran."
[Smith 1984]
Of course, wishful illusions may influence risk perception.
Especially around 1980, there was supposed to be less risk in oil
or gas because prices would not fluctuate, only rise onward and
upward, forever and ever. Political bodies are learning the
lesson a little more slowly and painfully than private. Our
purpose is to ascertain the reality toward which they are
trending.
4. Forces tending to lower government-owners' discount rates
Governments, especially OPEC governments, should in some
respects discount at a lower rate than U. S. companies.
4.1 There is nearly always much less geological risk than
in the United States, and sometimes hardly any. Deposits are
typically larger and not exhausted as soon, hence there need be
12
less probing of the unknown. There has never been much true
exploration in Saudi Arabia, for example, because, although it
always pays to find cheaper oil, it cannot be much cheaper. Of
50 known oil fields, only 15 are currently operated. [AAPG 1981,
1982, 1983] [Oil & Gas Journal 1984]
4.2 There is no risk of unfavorable government action
to reduce profits, since the nation-owner is sovereign.
However, these two risk reductions are relatively small
because geological and political variations are largely uncorrel-
ated with general market changes. Hence they serve as diversi-
fiers, and add relatively little to the riskiness of the hypothe-
tical portfolio. Accordingly, their absence does not much
diminish risk.
4.3 A more complex issue is that of fluctuations in
revenues. Let us defer discussion of one component of revenues,
i. e. sales volume, and consider first the net revenue per unit
sold: price less unit cost.
Unit cost in the OPEC nations is usually only a minor or
even negligible fraction of U. S. cost. [Adelman 1986a, 1986b]
Since unit net revenue is a residual, the lower the cost,
the less the fluctuations.2
2 The variability of net profit margins is much reduced in
the United States by the so-called Windfall Profits Tax, which is
really an excse tax on the difference between the market price
and a base price. Thus the government takes most of a price
increase and bears most of a price decrease. The tax was an
13
In normal times, of the sort we have not seen since 1973,
and are not likely to see again soon, price fluctuations would be
correlated positively with the general market. Hence the lower
net revenue fluctuations for a lower-cost producer would be a net
risk reduction, possibly an important one.
However, there are two modifications.
4.3.1 One is the cartel itself. Far from bringing
stability--the usual dogma--it has greatly increased price
fluctuations and risk.
4.3.2 The price movements have been mostly contra-cyc-
lical, because oil is so large an industry that large price
increases hurt world economic growth, and price decreases help.
This was true after 1973, and again after 1978. The brisk
recovery in North America and the slower one in Europe and Asia
since 1982 have coincided with major price decreases. The
collapse in early 1986 has seemed favorable to economic growth.
Since higher oil prices and much higher profits have
coincided with lower profits elsewhere, fluctuating oil prices
have been a diversifier for private owners.
But for the cartel nations, price fluctuations have not
been exogenous events, but rather the result of their own
actions. Hence it would be fallacious to argue that the offsets
important earnings stabilizer until the price collapse of 1985-
1986.
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to oil price increases, acting as a diversifier, have been
beneficial to these nations.
However, the chances of another price explosion seem
to be less than previously, and even if one again happened, there
seems to be much less room for a profitable increase. Hence the
contra-cyclical nature of oil profits may have disappeared, or at
least lessened, and the lower costs of the producing countries
may now be an appreciable stabilizer.
Or, what points to the same conclusion derived from option
theory, the less the expected future variability, the less
the value of the option held by a high-cost producer, who hopes
for a windfall gain some day. But a low-cost producer remains
indifferent.
I would conclude, without trying to quantify the
proposition, that the forces tending to reduce the exporting
nations' discount rates are non-negligible, but minor.
5. Forces tending to raise exporter nations' discount rates
5.1 Amplified output fluctuations
Cartel oil has been the oil of last resort because its
price is never lower and often higher than non-cartel oil.
Cartelists produce only what they can sell, without undermining
the price. Since late 1985, they have of course been striving
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with all their might to make non-cartel producers share that
responsibility for supporting the price. But so far (June 1986)
they have not succeeded. Non-cartel producers have felt free to
shade or reduce prices in order to maintain sales volume. They
sell all they can produce, and take whatever price they can get.
Nor can we doubt that if non-cartel producers agree with the
cartel on production sharing, they will be quick to repudiate
responsibility as soon as members or non-members cheat.
Accordingly, non-OPEC oil production has fluctuated very
little this past decade. The United States was stable, other
areas grew quite steadily. The cartel nations (OPEC plus
Mexico after 1981) have absorbed all the fluctuations in oil
output.
The cartel's gradual secular loss of markets due to the
long-run effect of higher prices in curbing demand and stimula-
ting supply is uncorrelated risk. But the variability of
cartel sales has been largely an amplified version of changes in
oil and energy consumption in response to general business
conditions. It is correlated risk and non-diversifiable. On
this count, cartel -ations' oil income is much more risky than
oil income generally.
5.2 The national "portfolio"
We turn now to a more pervasive difference between public
and private owners. The basic assumption of the capital asset
16
pricing model, as pointed out earlier, is that a given asset is
only a minor part of a broad portfolio. Or what comes to the
same thing, the income from a given asset must be small in
relation to all other sources of income.
5.2.1 Industrial- countries
In the United States in 1982, oil and gas production net
revenues were only 2.25 percent of the GNP; in Britain they
were expected to peak at about 5 percent in 1984-5.3
The national or social discount rate on oil-gas properties
owned or taxed by a large industrial country can therefore be no
more than the 10-11 percent shown in Table I above. It can
hardly be much less, because the income flow from the stock
market portfolio is already so widely diversified that it
closely approaches the maximum possible for any income flow.
The social or national discount rate on petroleum extraction
According to the Survey of Current Business, July 1983 pp.
68-69, 1982 gross national product in current dollars was $3073
billion. Gross product in all mining was $116 billion. Oil and
gas extraction accounted for 60 percent of net mining income
(without capital consumption adjustment). Accordingly, we may
estimate oil and gas extraction gross income at $69.6 billion.
This is roughly corroborated by the Bureau of the Census, Annual
Survey of 1O and Gas 1982, Table 5 ("net company interest
statistics"). Total lease revenues from oil and gas sales were
$103 billion. Subtracting $46 billion of capitalized expenditur-
es, we have roughly $56 billion that might be called gross income
to the factors. Since the Annual Survey is no longer published,
it is not possible to update the comparison. For the U. K., see
The Economist, June 9, 1984, p. 67.
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cannot possibly be as low as the 5 percent used as the standard
in British nationalized industries. [HMSO 1978, Rees 1979]
In smaller industrial countries, like Norway and the
Netherlands, there is less diversification through the national
income. There is, however, a perverse kind of diversification,
even a contra-cyclical effect, which has become a cliche, the
"Dutch disease". Oil or gas exports lead to an overvalued
currency, which in turn reduces non-hydrocarbon exports. (This
has been widely discussed. For a good brief account, see [Econo-
mist 1982].)
5.2.2 LDC owners
Once we get beyond the oil producers of the developed
world, we confront a difference in degree so great it becomes one
in kind.
All the OPEC producers, and to an important degree Mexico,
are in the position of the individual or corporate person
whose oil holdings are most of its holdings, and oil income most
of its income. 4
Diderik Lund has pointed out that with large-scale oil
or gas production, the composition of the national portfolio
changes. One might expect that the in-ground asset is exchanged
for various above-ground assets. Thus the portfolio changes, the
risk-weighted interest rate becomes endogenous, and an analytical
solution of the sequential optimum depletion rate much more
complex. I believe Lund is correct. If the presence of oil
wealth makes the nation-owner more not less oil-dependent, the
risk-adjuste' rate is even higher than our simplified analysis
would indicate.
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Some of the oil producing nations have built up substantial
holdings of foreign assets, but with the exception of Kuwait and
Brunei, the income derived from them is only a small proportion
of oil income. For example, in mid-1984, Saudi Arabia had about
100-120 billion of foreign assets. [WSJ 1984, Financial Times
1984 ] We take the lower estimate to allow for non-earning
assets like Iraqi "debts". For comparabili
to this amount the current 11 percent (real
assets of corresponding risk, not the much
lower-risk securities, hence an annual yiel
billion. When the kingdom produced 8.5 mil
(mbd) for sale at $34, total oil income was
(assuming production costs at 50 cents per
percent was no less than 104/(104+13.2) or
then, oil income has dropped precipitately,
income-earning assets, which today are appa
ty, we should impute
) rate of return on
lower rates on
d of $9.6 - $13.2
lion barrels daily
$104 billion
barrel), and the oil
89 percent. Since
but so have foreign
rently no more than
$55 billion. [WSJ 1986] The financial embarassment of the
kingdom is shown by its failure to calculate and publish an
annual budget for 1986.
The 1982 oil percent of GNP among the Persian Gulf producers
lay between 65 (Saudi Arabia) and 70 (Kuwait), except in Iran,
where in 1981 it was 40. For the largest non-Persian Gulf
producers it is less: Algeria 32, Indonesia 16, Nigeria 26,
Libya 40, Venezuela 18. [CIA, 1983]
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But national income figures understate oil-dependence,
because a large fraction of the non-oil industries and occupa-
tions are really oil-dependent. Either they are direct oil-
service industries, or else they represent the spending of
oil-derived incomes. With no oil income, they lose their reason
for existence.
In a developed economy, the receivers of oil income have
skills or property which can be switched from oil to non-oil
activities, although the amount of non-oil income will presumably
be less than the amount of previous oil-derived income.
But this is not true of the oil-producing LDCs. Even
industries which look independent, e. g. which are exporters or
import-substitutes, may be subsidized--a use of resources, not a
source of income. Saudi Arabia exports wheat, but this is an
expensive hobby, not farming income, since the government buys it
from local farmers at seven times the world price. [WSJ 1984b]
The new refineries and petrochemical plants, now beginning
large-scale exporting, are more than a hobby, less than a source
of income. Worldwide, these industries are overbuilt and
shrinking. Nobody who is free to choose is building refineries.
Some are being sold at prices only a small fraction of construct-
ion costs.
The oil exporters' capital and operating costs are higher
than their competitors'. Their crude oil costs, for a refining
20
or petrochemical operation, are no lower. The true opportunity
cost of crude oil is its market value, since the alternative to
processing the crude is selling it. This is strictly true for a
competitive firm or an observant cartelist, who stays inside his
production quota. For a cheating cartelist, this is not true.
But given enough cheating the cartel disappears, and the state-
ment is again true.
Whether the oil-based industries will in time be regarded
as at least a means of education, or as merely "cathedrals in the
desert", does not concern us here. They are small or negligible
income-earners, hence non-diversifiers for oil production.
Indeed, the situation is even more extreme, in that oil
development damages pre-existing industries more severely than in
the developed countries. Nigeria is probably the outstanding
example of oil revenues making a country even more oil dependent.
Agricultural output has declined, and the towns have attracted
a large parasitic population (no less so for being very poor) for
whom the governments must provide food and other imported
necessities at subsidized low prices. In a less extreme form,
the same afflictlcn hclds of the other exporters. [World Bank
1981. Amuzegar 1982] Even when oil exports are a relatively
small percentage of national income, they may be a very high
percentage of imports. Mexico has become a well-known example.
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As the then Secretary General of OPEC warned:
"[The] gains of oil-induced growth tend to increase
rather than decrease the dependence...on the quantity and price
of crude oil exports." [Attiga 1981]
A private person with a high but uncertain income from his
one holding, who dislikes the high risk, could sell part of the
holding, and buy other assets, to lower his total risk. But to
sell part of their oil holdings is precisely what the exporting
nations cannot do. It is politically impossible; indeed, utterly
repugnant. After all, they only recently nationalized their
respective oil industries. And even if they were willing to sell
they would find few takers, who would offer insultingly low
prices, because of the risk of later expropriation.
Hence each oil exporting nation is locked into its holding
of the one asset which accounts for most of its income, or most
of its foreign exchange earnings. They would quickly perish
without the oil-derived purchasing power to buy foreign food,
manufactured products, and services. Here is perhaps the most
important single difference between private and public holdings.
5.2.3 Measuring additional risk for cartel nations
The increased risk in holding one asset is well illustrated
by Pogue. He took the fluctuations of the whole stock market as
unity. His sample of 18 industries taken as a group had an
equity Beta of 1.03, not much greater than the market as a
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whole. Then, allowing for leverage, he arrived at an asset Beta
of only 0.81 for the whole group.
But if we assume that a holder held stock in only one
industry, and was not free to diversify his portfolio, then the
relevant variable is not the security's covariance with the
market, but only the variance of the single industry. Every
individual industry had a much larger standard deviation than did
the whole market; on the average, it was 2.3 times as large.
[Pogue, Exhibit GAP 2.]
The investor confined to one security, who cannot diversify
even into individual holdings within the industry, is running an
even greater risk.
5.3 Cartel nations as leveraged corporations
We remarked earlier that to arrive at the Beta for total
assets, we must remove the effect of leveraging. But the
oil producing nations are leveraged. They are like private
companies with high levels of debt or high rentals, i. e., with
large prior claims on their gross income. The governments tend,
even more than private persons, to anticipate and overspend
future income, saddle themselves with debts or other
commitments. The greater the oil income, the more they leverage
it.
The financial history of the OPEC nations is revealing.
Even in the 1950s, when oil revenues were trifling by today's
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standards, governments strongly complained that it was difficult
to live with fluctuating incomes. The tension became intolerable
in 1959, when some of the multinational oil companies responded
to lower market prices by reducing the revenues per barrel. A
direct result was the 1960 Baghdad meeting which launched OPEC.
As the preamble put it: "any fluctuation in the price of
petroleum necessarily affects the implementation of the Members'
programmes". [Pergamon Press 1984] Of course, one could deal
with fluctuations by saving a large fraction of one's current
income and accumulate financial assets to use as a stabilizer.
Neither then nor now did it seem like an available option.
Much higher revenues have not only increased oil dependence,
but have also led to much greater commitments to spend oil
revenues, and even anticipate them. In 1974, the current account
surplus of the OPEC nations was $69 billion, several times any
previous peak. By 1978, the surplus was gone; Saudi Arabia ran
both a budget and foreign-exchange deficit. The reason for this
massive turnabout was a surge in imports of goods and services,
and in spending outside the respective countries. [IMF 1982, IMF
19863
The discomfiture of the governments was strongly voiced
in 1978. The then OPEC Secretary General warned that if OPEC
exports stagnated there would be "political and economic disas-
ters" in the OPEC nations because of revenue cutbacks and disap-
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pointed expectations. [Jaidah 1978] There was nothing new or
startling in this warning; it was generally accepted as true,
leading to the correct expectation of a price increase coming in
1979, slack market or not.
The opportunity was taken in 1979-81, when despite the
absence of any shortage--as is generally recognized today--prices
were driven up to more than double, in real terms, by restric-
ting output and panicking the market. The 1980 current account
surplus was "only" $111 billion because imports chased up so
fast. The surplus gave way to a deficit in two years, and the
OPEC nations remain in deficit. Saudi Arabia is in deficit on
both budget and current account. [IMF 1986, SAMA 1984]
Thus the OPEC and some non-OPEC exporters have managed
to put themselves into the position of a highly leveraged
corporation. If we adjust the risk premium without any allowance
for un-leveraging--because the holder is in fact leveraged--the
risk premium becomes 8*2.3, or 18.4 percent, and the total
required return or cost of capital is then 20.4 percent. Some of
these governments have made the analogy exact by going deeply
into debt, but this is only the most extreme example.
5.3.1 Leveraging of mineral income in the XVI century
There is a historical precedent. King Philip II of Spain
used the proceeds of a huge mining business (silver from Mexico
and Peru) to take over a good sized business in ocean shipping
25
and wholesale groceries (the annexation of Portugal). In seeking
power and glory, King Philip spent the combined proceeds--and
more. He was the wealthiest monarch in Christendom, and went
broke the most often. Accordingly, he paid increasingly high
interest rates, because his creditors realized, sometimes a
bit late, that the risk had been transferred to them. [Elliott
1963] [Braudel 1966]
5.3.2 Problems of adaptation to lower revenues
Nobody knows how much of these governments' outlays are
irreducible. (For a careful examination, though now outdated,
see [Moran 1978]. The corresponding numbers would be much higher
today.)
Cutting the incomes and subsidies of various groups may
threaten social unrest or revolution. We referred earlier to the
grotesque subsidy to Saudi Arab wheat farming. It has proved
impossible to eliminate, and extremely difficult even to reduce.
If some of the payments are untouchable, like a
corporation's rental and interest payments, this concentrates the
fluctuations on the remainder of the revenues, which fluctuate
more than does the otal. This vulnerability to fluctuations
should make a rational owner put a high discount rate on future
incomes.
5.4 Political instability
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There is an additional source of risk, resulting from
the inherent instability of most of these governments. Domestic
opposition has no outlet but conspiracy and violence; they are
also threatened by their neighbors.
Suppose we have been able to calculate, according to
the capital asset pricing model, a risk adjusted rate of
discount, call it i. It is not hard to show [Adelman 1982
pp. 59-60] that if there is a probability p that the owner of a
mineral deposit will, within any given year, suffer a sudden
complete and irrevocable loss of his property, the true discount
rate r, adjusted for that risk, is:
r = (i+p)/(1-p) [1]
Suppose we believe there is a 50-50 chance of a ruling
party or faction or junta or family being overthrown from inside
or outside within 20 years. Then in any given year, there is a
3.4 percent chance of overthrow. If the discount rate, for
ordinary business risk, is 20 percent, then the risk-adjusted
rate is: r = (.20+.034)/(1-.034) = 24.2 percent. 5
When calculating oil development costs in the 1960s, I
assumed a 9 percent cost of capital in the United States, and 20
As in large matters, so in small. "Observers who knew
[Iran] before the revolution say there is probably more [corrup-
tion] now. Before the revolution, those holding top jobs skimmed
2-3% off contracts. Now, since people frequently get sacked for
political reasons, they have to make their money faster; so they
take 10% or more." [Economist 1984]
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percent for firms operating in the OPEC nations. [Adelman 1972,
ch. 2 ] It did not occur to me that this discount rate (which, I
was informed, was about what oil companies were using) was an
implicit forecast of an even chance of expropriation within 7.2
years. That is:
p=(r-i)/(1+r)=(.20-.09)/1.2=.092, and (1-.092)7.2 = .5
If we take the year of forecast as 1966, that was not a bad
guess.
5.4 Summary
If governments were subject only to the risks facing a
producer of oil and gas in the United States, they should
properly discount future income streams at about 10 percent,
i.e. 2 percent riskless and 8 percent risk premium. (The capital
market would furnish no equity funds at a lower rate.) If we
conservatively assume that they have no control over at least
one-fourth of their incomes, then they should add about two
percent to the risk premium, and discount at about 12 percent.
If we recognize that they cannot diversify income to any signifi-
cant degree, the required rate goes sharply higher, probably
above 20 percent. Recognizing the probability of a "short sharp
shock" to the current regime requires another substantial boost.
The total varies among nations, of course, but for the current
regime in Saudi Arabia it must exceed 20 percent. For Kuwait it
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is lower, since true non-oil income, derived from foreign
investment, is higher in relation to oil income. For all others,
it must be higher.
6. Some objections considered
The range of discount rates suggested here, from 8-11
percent in the USA to two-three times that much in the OPEC
countries, will probably arouse some disagreement.
6.1 The "r percent rule"
One reason is the widely held belief in the "Hotelling
paradigm or r percent rule" [Miller & Upton 1985], according to
which minerals prices, less extraction costs, must inevitably
rise at the relevant rate of interest. It would follow logically
that future receipts (and, with some adjustment, future prices)
should be discounted at a near-riskless rate. Certainly price
appreciation at any risky rate is not of this world. Fifty years
at 10 percent per year is an increase by a factor of 117; 100
years, by a factor of nearly 14,000.
The attempts to measure the Hotelling effect have assumed
riskless discount rates, without however trying to justify them
or discuss the actual risks of mineral operations, including
petroleum. [Heal & Barrow 1981: U. K. Treasury bills] [Smith,
V. K. 1981: prime commercial loans, high grade municipals,
one-year corporate bonds, 30 year corporate bonds, and stock
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exchange call loans.] [Devarajan & Fisher 1981: no reference to
appropriate discount rates.] [Marshalla and Nesbitt 1986: a range
of 2 to 6 percent]
In this paper, I wil
justify a position. The
the price-increase paradi
inadequate econometrician
the discounted net return
given deposit in any year
which in turn equals any
risk. This is no truism;
economics. But the Hotel
paradigm of net prices ri
scarcity is the uncertain
forces: diminishing retur
1 merely state without trying to
failure of econometric verification of
gm is due neither to inadequate data nor
s. The Hotelling principle is correct:
from extracting a mineral unit from a
must equal that in any other year,
return from a holding with equal
it is a basic insight into mineral
ling principle does not require the
sing at all, at any rate. Mineral
fluctuating result of conflicting
ns versus increasing knowledge. Prices
therefore rise and fall. Discount rates for the minerals
tries, which incorporate price risk, should be--and are--
normal commercial range.
6.2 Optimal depletion rates
One can cite some respected names
proposition that the higher the interes
risk, the higher the optimal depletion
exhaustion of a mineral deposit; and vi
Heal 1979] [ICF 1979] [Kay and Mirlees
in the
in support of the
t rate, or the greater the
rate and the faster the
ce versa. [Dasgupta and
1975] [Nordhaus 1973]
indus-
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[Pindyck 1978] [Posner 1972] [Solow 1974] As the ICF authors
state (p. II-5): "If extractors become less fearful that their
fields will be expropriated, it is no longer rational to pump as
vigorously, much as if there were an unanticipated reduction in
the interest rate."
But this idea is mistaken. A changed discount rate can
raise or lower the optimal depletion rate. [Gordon 1966]
[Adelman 1982] It is true that cet. par. a higher interest rate
makes it less attractive to keep an asset in the ground, and
favors increased extraction. It is also true that investment per
unit of output rises with the rate of output, and with cumulative
output, since one factor, the deposit, is fixed. But the higher
interest rate makes the increasing investment per unit more
expensive. The first effect promotes investment and output, the
second depresses it.
Clearly, the relation between the discount rate and the
optimal depletion rate is complex and depends on current and
expected costs and prices. Let us take an extreme but realistic
case, where cost--investment requirements per unit of capaci-
ty--is very low. :!re the first effect tends to overbear the
second. Hence the high discount rates of the LDC exporting
nations should on the whole induce higher depletion rates--
assuming they act as competitors. But this effect has been
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dominated, of course, by the need to restrict output to maintain
prices. We now turn to this aspect.
7. Exploitation of a monopoly position
We have shown elsewhere that if the reaction of consumption
to a higher prices takes time, and the consumption reduction
declines exponentially, then the relation between timeless
elasticity E and present-value-weighted elasticity E' is as
follows:
(Pa/Pb)E' = (i/(c+i)) + (Pa/Pb)E * (1-(i/(c+i))) [2]
where Pa and Pb are prices before and after the change, i is the
discount rate, and c is the exponential decay rate of the
consumption effect. Table II gives some illustrative cases.
[T A B L E II H E R E]
Assume that demand elasticity for a product is unity. If
the effect were felt immediately, or if the discount rate were
zero, it would not pay a monopolist to raise the price. But if
the delay has a half-life of e. g. seven years, then with a 10
percent discount rate the effective elasticity is only about
-0.5, and with a 25 percent discount rate, elasticity is only
-0.32. A 1 percent price increase would increase the discounted
present value of revenues by 0.68 percent; a 1 percent decrease
would lower revenues in the same proportion.
This, in my opinion, is the most important effect of higher
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discount rates and shorter time horizons: a cartel gravitates
toward a policy of "take the money and run".
8. Exporter country attitudes
It may be objected that even if high discount rates are
correct in theory, and oil-exporting governments should in their
own interest use them, yet they believe low discount rates are
"right", and act accordingly.
This argument is often confused with another one: that
revenues from oil sold today bring not wealth but "illth" to the
nation: conspicuous waste, social disruption, etc. This argument
assumes as a fact that more income is bad. If so, one should
keep the oil in the ground whether it is worth much or little.
The nation deliberately chooses a second-best. The best would
be to produce the oil and invest the proceeds for the benefit of
this and future generations. But one assumes it will not be
well invested. Better therefore to keep it in the ground, where
it has at least some value. Perhaps the policy will improve in
the future. 6
6 Michael C. Lynch has suggested that if E is called
the percentage of income "not wasted", then the asset value is:
V(t) = E * P(n) * (l+i)n
where V(t) is the asset value at the present time, P(n) is the
price received n years ago, and i the interest rate at which one
might have invested it. But he points out that there is a hidden
assumption, namely that the government will henceforth spend the
money "wisely". Otherwise, the income from the reinvested asset
will itself e "wasted" at the same rate. Then one faces the
original problem: produce and sell the oil, or keep it.
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On its premises, the argument is sound. The risk, which
governs the present value of the flow of revenues, is not
relevant. Of course, one man's "waste and corruption" is
another man's delight. Moreover, an income corruptly gained,
then reinvested abroad in productive assets, is a net gain to the
economy, however unjustly distributed. Public or private
investment in a money-losing enterprise which requires subsidized
imports to keep functioning, is a running sore on the body
politic, however fair, just, and reasonable is the division of
the burden.
Returning to discount rates: certainly oil-exporting
governments (and others) have long insisted that they consider
far-off gains very close to present gains, and would therefore
prefer to keep oil in the ground than put money in their purse.
But an unsupported statement by an interested party is
not good evidence. These governments want consumers to believe
that they are producing more than economic interest would
indicate, or making a "sacrifice" for the sake of the world
economy. Thus we owe them political or other favors to insure
"access" to oil. Certainly the belief that our statesmen must
and do assure "access" has been a foundation-dogma for U. S.
policy-makers for well over a decade. [Kissinger, "Foreword", in
[Ebinger 1982], a volume dedicated to the proposition that
"access" is a major problem.]
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No good reason has ever been given for assuming the dogma
that exporting nations produce more oil and more revenues
than they wish. Moreover, the surge of imports noted above,
which twice turned massive OPEC surpluses into deficits, would be
sufficient proof that these governments want more revenues not
less to spend. Furthermore, during the repeated oil gluts since
1973, there have been repeated opportunities for Saudi Arabia and
others with small populations to let others have the market, and
keep their oil in the ground, as they say they yearn to do. Of
course they have done no such foolish thing, but rather maneuver-
ed and fought for the largest possible market share compatible
with maintaining the price. Better to watch what they do than
what they say.
But perhaps producers, including exporting governments,
may simply be mistaken, impressed by fashionable Club-of-Rome
hysteria, or more sober papers in various journals, or endless
repetition by statesmen in the consuming countries, or just
blindly following an un-examined rule.
This argument is not to be lightly dismissed. But it
can only be tested, if at all, by an appeal to history. The
difficulty is that an expected rise in price acts like a lower
discount rate. Before 1982, the oil industry expected that
prices were inexorably headed upward. [OGJ 1982, OGJ 1984] In
this sense, the industry acted for a time as if their discount
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rates were considerably lower than market rates. The oil
exporting nations acted just like private parties, but they were
much more vulnerable to price decreases--another way of saying
their risks were greater.
9. Conclusion
Non-industrial oil exporting countries, as rational income-
receivers and wealth-holders, should discount future oil revenues
at rates much higher than private oil producers, in no case below
20 percent per year, and mostly above 25 percent.
We drew attention to the Blitzer-Lessard-Paddock paper
suggesting that the discrepancy in price risk between oil
companies and governments made it profitable for both sides to
put the risk on the oil companies, and compensate them for taking
it. If our argument is sound, the potential gains are indeed
great.
The short horizons of the cartel nations favor large
quick price boosts. But they also force some cartelists into
breaking away and playing the reluctant price cutter in order to
obtain immediate ch b)enefits, however short-sighted they know
their actions to be.
TABLE
ESTIMATES OF DISCOUNT
AND NATURAL GAS COMPANIES
Estimator
Time
Period
Riskless
Rate
I
RATES (REAL) FOR CRUDE OIL
(in percent
Asset Risk
Factor
(Beta)
per year)
Real Cost of
Capital on:
Equity Assets
Terry & Hill
Eggleston
Pogue
Baldwin,
Mason, &
Ruback
1964 n. a.
1974-78 n. a.
1978-79 2.0
Paddock
DataMetrics
Herold
McPherson
& Palmer
1960-82
1970-82
1972
1982
1980s
1980s
Arthur An-
dersen & Co.1980s
2.0
2.0
0.5
0.5
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
1.12
1.02
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
12.0
11.8
11.9
13.3
10.2
10.0
9.6
9.3
n. a. 10-15-20
n. a.
n. a.
15-20
10
[SOURCES: Terry & Hill, Eggleston, in M. A. Adelman, The
World Petroleum Market (1972), pp. 53-54.
Gerald A. Pogue, in U. S. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission, Williams Pipe Line Co., Docket Nos. OR79-1,
et al, Verified Statement, Exhibit GAP-2. Carliss Y. Bald-
win, Scott P. Mason, and Richard S. Ruback, "Cost of Cap-
ital for the Cold Lake Project", unpublished paper in MIT
Center for Energy Policy Research-Sloan School ofManagement
Workshop, Energy Project Evaluation, April 21-23, 1983.
James L. Paddock, unpublished paper, 1984. Paddock also esti-
mates long-term realized rather than expected returns, which
reflect the significant losses to fixed-interest debt holders
as average market yields rose: 8.3 and 8.0 percent, respectively.
DataMetrics (G. Campbell Watkins), The Oil & Gas Invest-
ment Climate: Changes Over a Decade (Canadian Energy
Research Institute, Study No. 20, June 1984, chapter 3;
capital cost computed. John S. Herold, Inc., periodical
appraisals. McPherson & Palmer, op. cit. Arthur Andersen
& Co., Oil & Gas Reserve Disclosures (Survey of 300 Public
Companies 1980-83 (published 1984).
1953 n.a. n. a. n. a. 8
n. a.
1.070
1.234
n. a.
13.1
n. a.
9
11.2
12.9
CALCULATION
TABLE I (cont.)
OF COST OF CAPITAL FROM WATKINS STUDY
Asset beta
Equity beta
Real c.o.c.
Cost of Equity 1972=
11.9
M1972=
RF 1972 +Beta
=.5+
8.643
1972 (M1972-RF1972)
1.4 (M1972-.5)
Cost of Equity 1982= RF 1982
13.3 =.5+
M1982= 9.149
Cost of asset capital
Cost of asset capital
1972=
1982=
+Beta 1982 (M1982-RF1982)
1.48(M1982-.5)
.5+1.12(8.64-.5)
9.617
.5+1.02(9.15-.5)
9.392
1972
1.12
1.4
11.9
1982
1.02
1.48
13.3
TABLE II. TIMELESS ELASTICITY AND
PRESENT-VALUE-WEIGHTED ELASTICITY
Definitions:
- quantity before price change
- quantity after price changeQa
Mb = price before change
Pa = price after change
: timeless elasticity of demand
- present-value-weighted elasticity of demand
= risk-adjusted discount (interest) rate
: half-life of effect of price change on quantity change
= annual rate of exponential decay of effect of price
change
= exponential
Relations:
e-ch = 0.5, hence -ch = -. 693, c = .693/h
(pa/Pb)E =
Assumptions:
hence
Ea/Pb
E
h
C
(1/(c+i)) = (Pa/Pb)E*
3
0.231
5
0.139
Values assumed
c = .231
i = .10
c = .139
i = .10
c = .099
i = .1
E'
-0.697
-.580
-0.496
Values assumed
c = .231
i = .25
c = .139
i = .25
c = .099
i = .25
E
E' 
i
h
c
e
7
0.099
-0.479
-0.327
-0.322
(1-(i/(c+i)))
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